From Greenland to AI: Cyber Threat Insights from Davos 2026

Published by:
Aree Kang
Published on:
January 28, 2026

Introduction

From 19 to 23 January 2026, the World Economic Forum convened in Davos, Switzerland, under the theme ‘A Spirit of Dialogue’. The irony felt stark. The transatlantic relationship is itself experiencing a crisis of dialogue, as the US turns its gaze away from Europe toward the Americas, while Europe contends with internal divisions and security threats at its doorstep.

Emerging technologies - and their potential to reshape institutions, balances of power and economic norms - also steered conversations around security. The world’s interconnectivity is greater than ever, demanding unified responses to complex security threats. As this need for unity is challenged, events like Davos are necessary barometers for organisations seeking to prepare for or protect against geopolitical and economic shocks.

The 2026 Davos speakers have reflected on, demanded changes to, or challenged pre-held notions of international order. Below, SecAlliance explores what was said at Davos and why it matters to the cyber threat landscape.

Trump’s foreign policy actions will prompt Europe to reassess its security alliance with the US.

‘Are we in an irreversible rift? No. But there is a clear and present danger. If we want to preserve the alliance, both sides need to be very, very careful.’
- Edgars Rinkēvičs, President of Latvia
‘But I don't have to use force. I don't want to use force. I won't use force.’
– Donald Trump, President of the United States

This year’s Davos forum was held under the shadow of recent US actions in Venezuela. US President Donald Trump’s actions and rhetoric underscore an agenda to pursue influence - and even territory - in the Americas.  

Specifically, Trump’s rhetoric around Greenland has shaken NATO. Trump threatened to impose tariffs on the EU and refused to rule out the use of military force, only to walk back both measures at Davos.

Despite this change in stance, European states are almost certain to continue reassessing their security and intelligence cooperation with the US in response to Trump’s mercurial foreign policy decisions.

The Dutch and UK intelligence services have revealed that they have scaled back or suspended intelligence sharing with the US. In January 2026, Germany also expanded the mandate of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) for offensive cyber operations and surveillance, likely to reduce reliance on US intelligence.

Reduced transatlantic intelligence sharing could undermine efforts to counter cross-border cyber threats. Successful law enforcement measures rely heavily on multinational cooperation, which is threatened by moves toward isolationism and unilateralism.  

US interest in Greenland is also unlikely to disappear overnight. Cyber-enabled influence operations targeting Greenlandic or European entities to promote US interests are a realistic possibility. However, there is a remote chance that the US will direct cyber-enabled espionage or disruption attacks against the European private sector. Even if the transatlantic relationship is frayed with power asymmetry and strategic misalignment, the fundamental rules and norms that underpin the alliance are unlikely to be overrode overnight.

Transatlantic strife continues to push Europe to decouple from US Big Tech.

Since Trump’s second term began, the EU has been trying to decouple from US tech with an unprecedented sense of urgency, fearing cutoffs that could disrupt critical infrastructure in the event of an escalating conflict. This sentiment - and its challenges - were reflected throughout Davos.

Multiple European public sector entities have replaced Microsoft with open-source or homegrown solutions, while countries are championing the development of domestic cloud capabilities. However, Europe still heavily relies on US tech, with Microsoft, Amazon and Google accounting for 70% of Europe’s cloud infrastructure.

‘We should not try to become the next hyperscaler. Is this really so important for us? No, we have other strengths in Europe.’
– Aiman Ezzat, Capgemini CEO

Big Tech providers are unlikely to give up this market share so easily. AWS, for one, unveiled its sovereign European cloud solution in January 2026. Yet questions remain over whether sovereign clouds can solve the fundamental issue, as the providers are subject to US jurisdiction.

Even with strategic policymaking at the EU level, companies are likely to struggle with vendor lock-in, logistical and financial costs, and, ironically, EU regulations that may encourage them to choose vendors that meet oversight requirements, which often include US providers.

‘We have to go for technology adoption as fast as possible. And, yes, sometimes it is going to be at the expense of sovereignty.’
– Aiman Ezzat, Capgemini CEO

Some voices at Davos have also warned against the drive to shun out US tech and regulatory overreach, especially in realms like AI, where innovation is important. Concerns remain over whether the EU can scale capabilities fast enough to develop a homegrown industry and genuine US and Chinese competitor.  

It is likely that European companies will remain dependent on US Big Tech for cloud and software services in the long term, though the extent of that dependence will likely decrease as the EU pursues a long-term resilience strategy. It is also plausible that ambitions in AI and quantum computing will create the appetite for less stringent regulations in the medium to long term.

In a multipolar world order, middle powers may cultivate independent cyber capabilities.

‘We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition.’
– Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada

Mark Carney’s address at Davos made headlines for heralding the end of the rules-based international order. Importantly, he called on middle powers to collaborate and develop strategic autonomy vis-à-vis great powers.

‘I still think there are more multilateralists than there are transactionalists in this world.’
– Alexander Stubb, President of Finland

This could include autonomous cyber capabilities with reduced dependence on intelligence and technology from great powers. Digital middle powers are also likely to pursue similar coalitions based on shared values, as well as economic and trade partnerships, while balancing relations with great powers.

Some of the numerous bilateral and multilateral tech cooperation initiatives launched in 2025 include the Semiconductor Coalition between nine EU member states, the UAE-France Framework for Cooperation in Artificial Intelligence and AI and Quantum Technology Cooperation between Germany and India.

Capacity building in critical sectors such as AI, semiconductors, and quantum computing, independent of the US and China, will realistically expand digital middle powers’ cyber capabilities and resilience in the long term.

Artificial Intelligence is increasing the volume and sophistication of cyber attacks.

‘It would be a big mistake to ship these chips’ – Amodei, Anthropic CEO

Unsurprisingly, the impact of AI was felt throughout Davos. Politically, it remains a bone of contention between the US and China.

Although Trump lifted the export ban on advanced AI chips such as the H200 to China, Beijing aims to prioritise self-reliance in semiconductors to achieve AI supremacy by 2030. It is almost certain that China will continue to invest in indigenous AI chip capabilities, facilitated by sustained cyberespionage and IP theft operations targeting semiconductor and AI companies.

‘AI is increasing the velocity and complexity of attacks.’
– Jill Popelka, DarkTrace CEO
‘[Attackers] don’t have to be skilled like they used to have to be.’
– Jessica Rosenworcel, Former Chairwoman of the Federal Communications Commission

Practically, AI has also significantly lowered the bar for attackers and will continue to do so in the long term. Notably, generative AI is likely to continue accelerating and industrialising malware generation and even automating the entire attack chain. AI has also enabled new attack techniques, such as social engineering via deepfake impersonations of executives and prompt-injection attacks targeting enterprise AI deployments.

‘The problem is interoperability. We are introducing new capabilities much faster than we understand what they can do and where they are going.’
– Nadav Zafrir, CheckPoint CEO

As businesses incorporate AI agents into their workflow, this also presents new attack surfaces. AI agents evolve dynamically, requiring different privileges for different tasks at various times. Agents even spawn new agents, rendering identity assignment based on a single entity obsolete. Hijacked agents with improperly managed access offer threat actors valuable opportunities for lateral movement and privilege escalation.

Quantum computing presents present and future security threats.

‘Q-Day is moving earlier and earlier’ – Niccolo de Masi, IonQ CEO
‘I think that moment will come in (20)26 or 27’ – Arvind Krishna, IBM CEO

At Davos, security remained a focus of quantum computing discussions as SEALSQ and WISeKey announced the inauguration of the ‘Year of Quantum Security.’ Meanwhile, experts raised concerns that the timeline for the arrival of cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) capable of breaking modern encryption is rapidly shrinking, potentially as early as 2030.

As emerging technologies advance, critical infrastructure sectors will face timely - and costly - pressures to migrate to technologies, such as quantum-safe cryptography.

Governments and industries with high-value intellectual property, such as the pharmaceutical and defence sectors, also face immediate threats. State actors may conduct ‘Harvest Now, Decrypt Later’ attacks, in which actors collect data to decrypt once they have access to a CRQC.

Furthermore, quantum cloud or quantum-as-a-service (QaaS) platforms already introduce new attack surfaces in quantum hardware and firmware, quantum-classical interfaces (QCIs), and classical components in the cloud system. As the quantum economy expands, with more organisations using the platforms and more vulnerabilities introduced, skilled threat actors are likely to exploit the flaws.

Conclusion

One year into Trump’s second presidency, geopolitical shifts are slowly but surely changing the rules of engagement. As expressed by this year’s Davos speakers, a reckoning is coming for the transatlantic relationship. Reduced collaboration and the pursuit of digital sovereignty may increase European resilience in the long term, but threats to intelligence-sharing may undermine law enforcement capabilities.

Middle powers may seize this opportunity to improve their own cyber defence and offence; however, Great Power responses to shifting balances of power may further undermine global stability in the medium to long term.

As the world faces seismic technological transformations, including in AI and quantum computing, changes to the cyber threat landscape are almost certain to be observed in the coming years.